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REGULATING BIG TECH

Regulating Big Tech:
Lessons From the FTC’s Do-Not-Call Rule
William E. Kovacic & David A. Hyman1

ABSTRACT
Big Tech (Amazon, Apple, Facebook, and Google) is under
regulatory assault. Cases have been brought against each of these
companies in multiple countries around the world, but there is an
emerging consensus that more needs to be done – most likely in the
form of ex ante regulation that prescribes rules of conduct for
dominant information platforms. The European Union and the
United Kingdom are well on the way to establishing such
frameworks, and the United States appears poised to undertake
similar measures in the coming years. Most of the debate has
focused on the case for ex ante regulation of Big Tech, with much
less attention to the complexities of developing and implementing
such regulation.
This is not the first time that regulators have sought to use ex ante
regulation to govern a technologically dynamic sector of the
economy. In 2003, the U.S. Federal Trade Commission (FTC)
promulgated its Do-Not-Call (DNC) Rule, which allows individuals
to block unsolicited commercial telephone calls by enrolling in a
national registry. The DNC Rule provides a useful case study of the
complexities of developing and implementing ex ante regulation of a
dynamic industry in the face of substantial legal, technological, and
political risks. We identify a series of lessons for those now seeking
to use similar strategies to regulate Big Tech.
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Kovacic is the Global Competition Professor of Law and Policy at the George
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Until quite recently, Big Tech (i.e., Amazon, Apple, Facebook, and Google)
was popular. These companies came from humble beginnings, but each
became paragons of the new Internet-based economy.2 Waves of adulation
from academics, journalists, and elected officials swept over the firms and
their founders.3
In recent years, apprehension and hostility have replaced awe and
admiration. Big Tech is under regulatory assault; governments around the
world have brought cases against all of these companies, alleging a wide
array of misdeeds, ranging from “abuse of dominance” to privacy
violations, disseminating hate speech and misinformation, and promoting
insurrection.4 Demands for further government intervention are pervasive -reflecting the perception that truly effective regulatory control requires new
or upgraded enforcers and policy instruments. Many of the resulting reform
measures rely on the use of ex ante rulemaking to prescribe conduct rules
for dominant information services platforms. The European Union and the
United Kingdom are in the midst of establishing such ex ante regulatory
mechanisms, and the United States seems poised to follow suit.
To date, most of the debate has focused on the case for (and against)
regulating Big Tech, with much less attention to the complexities of
developing and implementing ex ante regulation.5 But there is an extensive
2

Amazon and Apple were started in garages. Facebook and Google took shape in
university dorm rooms.
3
See section II, infra.
4
Id.
5
We address the complexities of implementation in a series of articles, including: David
A. Hyman & William E. Kovacic, State Enforcement in a Polycentric World, 2019 B.Y.U.
L. Rev. 1447; David A. Hyman & William E. Kovacic, Implementing Privacy Policy: Who
Should Do What, 29 Ford. Intell. Prop. Media & Ent. L.J. 1117 (2018); David A. Hyman &
William E. Kovacic, Consume or Invest? What Do/Should Agency Leaders Maximize, 91
Wash. L. Rev. 295 (2016); William E. Kovacic & David A. Hyman, Regulatory Leveraging:
Problem of Solution? 23 Geo. Mason. L. Rev. 1163 (2016); David A. Hyman & William E.
Kovacic, Can’t Anyone Here Play This Game? Judging the FTC’s Critics, 83 Geo. Wash. L.
Rev. 1948 (2015); David A. Hyman & William E. Kovacic, Institutional Design, Agency
Life Cycle, and the Goals of Competition Law, 81 Fordham L. Rev. 2163 (2013); David A.
Hyman & William E. Kovacic, Why Who Does What Matters: Governmental Design and
Agency Performance, 82 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1446 (2014); David A. Hyman & William E.
Kovacic, Competition Agency Design: What’s On the Menu, 8 EUROPEAN COMPETITION L.
J. 527 (2012)
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list of questions that must be asked and answered correctly if ex ante
regulation is to fulfill its promise. For starters, which of the problems with
Big Tech that people are complaining about are (and are not) solvable with
ex ante regulation? How can regulators acquire the knowledge needed to
diagnose these problems correctly and devise appropriate cures? How does
the certainty of continuing commercial dynamism affect regulatory design
and implementation? What information should be gathered to evaluate
whether the regulations are working as intended? How should the regulators
go about minimizing the sum of decision costs and error costs, and how
should they make trade-offs between these two types of costs?
History provides a useful touchstone for evaluating answers to these
questions. Almost twenty years ago, the FTC issued the Telemarketing
Sales Rule, generally known as the “Do-Not-Call Rule” (DNC Rule).6 The
DNC Rule allows individuals to block unsolicited commercial telephone
calls by enrolling in a national registry administered by the FTC. Drawing
on public records and our own recollections,7 we provide insight into how a
relatively small federal agency enjoyed considerable success in protecting
the nation’s “dinner hour” from unwanted calls.8 The FTC’s experiences
while developing and implementing the DNC Rule provide a useful case
study of the challenges that are likely to be encountered when agencies seek
to regulate Big Tech through ex ante rulemaking.
In Part II, we describe the still-evolving campaign to regulate Big Tech. In
Part III, we trace the history of the DNC Rule. In Part IV, we highlight six
challenges the FTC had to navigate in designing and launching the DNC
Rule. In Part V, we focus on three post-launch implementation challenges.
In Part VI we draw six lessons for the campaign to regulate Big Tech with
ex ante rulemaking. Part VII identifies barriers to incorporating these
lessons into the regulatory process. Part VIII concludes.

6

Telemarketing Sales Rule: Final Rule, 16 C.F.R. 310 (2003).
Our interest in the DNC Rule is not merely academic or professional. Both of us were
present in the General Counsel’s Office of the FTC when the agency created the DNC Rule.
We observed firsthand the difficulties associated with attempting to cross the distance
between the formulation of a good idea and its successful implementation in practice.
8
A Conversation with Tim Muris and Bob Pitofsky, FTC 90th Anniversary Celebration
at
174,
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_events/ftc-90thanniversary-symposium/040922transcript003.pdf (“Someone wrote my obituary while I was
chairman and said that they were going to put on my gravestone that I had protected the
dinner hour, which is fine. I don't mind that, although I don't think much about what's going
to be on my tombstone. Obviously in the general world, my tenure will be most known for
Do Not Call.”)
7
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II.

REGULATING BIG TECH: FROM HANDS-OFF TO EX ANTE
RULEMAKING

In roughly twenty years, the focal points of modern debates about Big Tech
(Amazon, Apple, Google, and Facebook) achieved extraordinary
commercial success and became objects of admiration.9 From the early
2010s forward, this began to change with the emergence of a massive new
literature, in scholarly circles and popular commentary, that decried a
failure of antitrust and other government policies to arrest dangerous
increases in economic concentration.10 Though not the only targets of
criticism, Big Tech has served as an exemplar of what had gone wrong.11
Modern discussions about Big Tech and competition policy have featured
three competing visions for competition policy.12 One vision favors the use
of existing policy tools to undertake a major expansion of antitrust
enforcement, including stronger controls upon mergers and dominant firm

9

Amazon was formed in 1994, Google in 1998, and Facebook in 2004. Apple was
established in 1976 but recast itself in the early 2000s with the introduction of portable
devices (the IPod, IPad, and IPhone).
10
The avalanche of literature includes Josh Hawley, THE TYRANNY OF BIG TECH (2021);
Amy Klobuchar, Antitrust (2021); David Dayen, MONOPOLIZED – LIFE IN THE AGE OF
CORPORATE POWER (2020) ; Thom Hartmann, THE HIDDEN HISTORY OF MONOPOLIES –
HOW BIG BUSINESS DESTROYED THE AMERICAN DREAM (2020); Sally Hubbard,
MONOPOLIES SUCK – 7 WAYS BIG CORPORATIONS RULE YOUR LIFE AND HOW TO TAKE
BACK CONTROL (2020); Barry C. Lynn, LIBERTY FROM ALL MASTERS – THE NEW
AMERICAN AUTOCRACY VS. THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE (2020); Michelle Meagher,
COMPETITION IS KILLING US (2020); Robert Reich, THE SYSTEM—WHO RIGGED IT, HOW
WE CAN FIX IT (2020); Binyamin Applebaum, THE ECONOMISTS’ HOUR—HOW THE FALSE
PROPHETS OF FREE MARKETS FRACTURED OUR SOCIETY (2019); Maurice E. Stucke & Ariel
Ezrachi, COMPETITION OVERDOSE—HOW FREE MARKET MYTHOLOGY TRANSFORMED US
CITIZEN KINGS TO MARKET SERVANTS (2019); Thomas Philippon, THE GREAT REVERSAL –
HOW AMERICA GAVE UP ON FREE MARKETS (2019); Zephyr Teachout, BREAK ‘EM UP –
RECOVERING OUR FREEDOM FROM BIG AG, BIG TECH, AND BIG MONEY (2020); Matt Stoller,
GOLIATH – THE 100-YEAR WAR BETWEEN MONOPOLY POWER AND DEMOCRACY (2019) );
Rana Foroohar, DON’T BE EVIL – THE CASE AGAINST BIG TECH (2019); Jonathan Tepper &
Denise Hearn, THE MYTH OF CAPITALISM – MONOPOLIES AND THE DEATH OF COMPETITION
(2019); Tim Wu, THE CURSE OF BIGNESS – ANTITRUST IN THE NEW GILDED AGE (2018) .
11
See generally Subcomm. on Antitrust, Commercial & Administrative Law, House
Comm. on the Judiciary, Majority Staff Report, Investigation of Competition in Digital
Markets (2020) (hereinafter House Judiciary Subcommittee Staff Majority Report) (calling
for an overhaul of the U.S. antitrust system, including new efforts to control large
information systems technology giants).
12
These visions are described in William E. Kovacic, Root and Branch Reconstruction:
The Modern Transformation of U.S. Antitrust Law and Policy? 35 ANTITRUST 46 (No. 3,
Summer 2021) (hereinafter Modern Transformation).
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conduct.13 The “expansionist” vision operates within a traditional antitrust
goals framework (which seeks to maximize consumer welfare), but argues
for more aggressive use of existing enforcement tools by antitrust agencies,
and believe several restrictive precedents should be overturned, based on
recent developments in economics.14
The second vision involves a top-to-bottom transformation of U.S.
competition policy. Often described as “New Brandeisians,”15
transformation advocates call for a “root and branch reconstruction”16 that
would re-orient doctrine and policy based on an egalitarian vision of citizen
welfare, and strive to eliminate monopoly power wherever it is found.
Transformation advocates reject the consumer welfare-driven framework
that has dominated antitrust since the 1980s, and argue for an approach
similar the one embraced by the Supreme Court in Brown Shoe v. United
States.17 Members of this second group now occupy key positions in the
federal government.18
A third vision opposes both the Expansionists and the New Brandeisians.19
This “traditionalist” vision endorses the retreat from expansive applications
of antitrust law that prevailed from the late 1930s through the early 1970s
and welcomes the judiciary’s adoption and application of an efficiencyoriented consumer welfare standard.20 They defend a federal enforcement
agenda that focuses mainly upon cartel agreements, large horizontal
mergers, and government policies that impede new entry into markets. Any
changes to current legal doctrine and contemporary enforcement policy
must be justified by empirically tested economic concepts, rather than by
armchair theorizing.
13

Jonathan B. Baker, THE ANTITRUST PARADIGM (2019); Carl Shapiro, Antitrust: What
Went Wrong and How to Fix It, 35 ANTITRUST 33 (No 3, Summer 2021).
14
Id.
15
Lina M. Khan, The New Brandeis Movement: America’s Antimonopoly Debate, 9 J.
EUROPEAN COMPETITION L. & PRACTICE 131 (2018).
16
Sandeep Vaheesan, How Robert Bork Fathered the Gilded Age, PROMARKET BLOG
(Sept. 5, 2019) (“Antitrust needs root and branch reconstruction”), at
https://promarketblog.org/how-robert-bork-fathered-the-new-gilded-age/.
17
370 U.S. 294, 315-23, 322 n.38 (1962).
18
Lina Khan is the chair of the FTC, Tim Wu is on the Council of Economic Advisors,
and Jonathan Kanter is the Assistant Attorney General (Antitrust) for the Department of
Justice. Pointing to their previous advocacy of strong regulatory intervention, Amazon,
Facebook, and Google have sought, so far without success, to recuse Khan and Kanter from
involvement in cases being brought against them. Laurence H. Tribe, Google’s Calls for
DOJ Antitrust Head Jonathan Kanter’s Recusal Are Baseless, ProMarket, Feb. 1, 2022,
https://promarket.org/2022/02/01/google-antitrust-kanter-doj-recusal-baseless-tribe/.
19
Joshua D. Wright et al., Requiem for a Paradox: The Dubious Rise and Inevitable Fall
of Hipster Antitrust, 51 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 293 (2019).
20
Id.
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As Big Tech’s star has fallen, both the expansionists and New
Brandeisians have urged Congress to create new mechanisms to control
large information services platforms. The most important of these measures
would create new ex ante regulatory mechanisms that rely upon prescriptive
rules to regulate large technology enterprises.21 The enthusiasm for
rulemaking reflects the view that the traditional antitrust litigation is a
clumsy, time-consuming, and often ineffective device for addressing
broader problems of market concentration.22 Traditional antitrust litigation
arguably has limited ability to incorporate policy considerations treated
more directly in other policy domains such as privacy.23 And, traditional
antitrust often moves at a glacial pace – especially when cases challenge the
conduct of large, dominant enterprises that can afford the best lawyers
money can buy. Of course, this problem is not new. As long-time antitrust
litigator Bruce Bromley noted in 1958, “I quickly realized in my early days
at the bar that I could take the simplest antitrust case . . . and protract it for
the defense almost to infinity.”24
Even if the duration of antitrust litigation falls somewhat short of infinity,
the time lag from case filing to final resolution is still quite striking. The
Department of Justice (DOJ) monopolization case that was filed against
Google in the Fall of 2020 in the U.S. District Court for the District of
Columbia is currently scheduled to go to trial in September 2023.25 When
one adds in the high likelihood of an appeal to the D.C. Circuit, followed by
an appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court, final resolution of the case is unlikely
before 2026 at the earliest. In like fashion, the European Commission’s
monopolization cases against Google began over a decade ago and remain
in litigation.26 The EC’s monopolization proceedings against Intel,
commenced fifteen years ago, plod ahead in the European Union’s courts,
with another major decision issued in January 2022. 27

21

House Subcommittee Majority Staff Report, supra, at 392-421; Stigler Center
Committee on Digital Platforms, Digital Platforms: Final Report (2019).
22
Id.
23
Laura Alexander, Privacy and Antitrust at the Crossroads of Big Tech (American
Antitrust Institute, Dec. 2021).
24
Bruce Bromley, Judicial Control of Antitrust Cases, 23 F.R.D. 417, 417 (1958).
25
United States v. Google LLC, Case 1:20-cv-03010 (D.D.C. Oct. 20, 2020) (original
complaint); United States v. Google LLC, Scheduling and Case Management Order, Case
1:20-cv-03010 (D.D.C. Dec. 21, 2020).
26
Google and Alphabet v. Commission (Google Shopping), Case T-612/17 (Nov. 10,
2021) (judgment of the General Court of the European Union).
27
Intel Corp v. European Commission, Case T-286-09 BENV (Jan. 26, 2022) (judgment
of the General Court of the European Union).
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In contrast, many commentators believe that rulemaking offers a
faster and more comprehensive solution.28 Some proposals target particular
(allegedly objectionable) practices,29 while others seek more sweeping
reforms, including no-fault liability for monopolization,30 prohibitions on
some or all acquisitions,31 limitations on entry into certain markets,32 and
compelled divestiture and break-ups.33
The proposals for more extensive ex ante regulation of large
information services platforms are not just academic theorizing. Multiple
jurisdictions have taken steps in this direction.34 In the United States,
legislation pending before Congress would bar certain information services
platforms from discriminating against firms that use their platforms.35 The
legislation authorizes the DOJ and the FTC to designate which online
platforms will be subject to the non-discrimination mandate, and further
authorizes both agencies to issue appropriate guidelines.36 A recent
executive order makes it clear that the Biden Administration is committed
to the use of rulemaking authority to promote competition.37
In Europe the parliament of the European Union (EU) recently
approved the Digital Markets Act (DMA) which establishes a new
regulatory framework for certain “gatekeeper” information services
platforms.38 The measure borrows heavily from concepts developed in EU
competition law and forbids a wide range of practices including certain
forms of discrimination against third parties that use the platform.39 The

28

Rohit Chopra & Lina M. Khan, The Case for “Unfair Methods of Competition”
Rulemaking, 87 CHI. L. REV. 357 (2020).
29
Yale Tobin Center for Economic Policy, Digital Regulation Project, International
coherence in digital platform regulation: an economic perspective in the US and EU
proposals (Policy Discussion Paper No. 5; Aug. 6, 2021).
30
Id.
31
Id.
32
Id.
33
Id.
34
Andrew I. Gavil et al., ANTITRUST LAW IN PERSPECTIVE: CASES, CONCEPTS AND
PROBLEMS IN COMPETITION POLICY 67-69 (4th ed. 2022).
35
“American Innovation and Online Choice Act, S2992. The companion bill in the
House of Representatives is H.R. 3816.
36
Id.
37
Executive Order 14036, Promoting Competition in the American Economy (July 9,
2021),
at
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidentialactions/2021/07/09/executive-order-on-promoting-competition-in-the-american-economy/.
38
Colin Wall & Eugenia Lostri, The European Union’s Digital Markets Act: A Primer
(Center
for
Strategic
&
International
Studies:
Feb.
8,
2022),
at
https://www.csis.org/analysis/european-unions-digital-markets-act-primer.
39
Id.
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DMA is expected to take effect by the end of 2022.40 Finally, the United
Kingdom is developing the foundations for a Digital Markets Unit (DMU)
which will be located within its existing antitrust enforcement agency (i.e.,
the Competition and Markets Authority, or CMA).41 Under the DMU
regime, the CMA will develop a regulatory code for each information
services platform deemed to hold a “strategic market position.”42 The
precise form and timing for the roll-out of the new regime await action by
the UK Parliament, which is considering where to situate the DMU
proposal in its legislative agenda.43
We now turn to the DNC Rule, and then consider its implications for ex
ante regulation of Big Tech.
II.
THE DNC RULE: HISTORY AND DESIGN DETAILS
Privacy is a relatively recent addition to the FTC’s policy portfolio.
Congress established the FTC in 1914, but the chief foundations of the
FTC’s modern privacy program were created in the 1960s and early 1970s
through legislation such as the Fair Credit Reporting Act.44 In 1994,
Congress expanded the Commission’s authority with the Telemarketing and
Consumer Fraud and Abuse Prevention Act.
By the end of the 1990s, the FTC had accumulated substantial experience
with telemarketing cases. For example, the Commission had prosecuted
numerous cases involving 1-900 telemarketing fraud. During the same time
frame, the frequency and intrusiveness of telemarketing sales calls was
dramatically increasing. A particular source of irritation was the tendency of
telemarketers to place calls to households in the evening during the dinner
hour.
The stimulus for the DNC Rule was the appointment of Timothy Muris as
FTC Chair in 2001. Muris and Howard Beales, the Director of the FTC’s
Bureau of Consumer Protection, spent the second half of 2001 planning
how to consolidate and extend the work the agency had carried out in the
1990s. The concept of a DNC Rule emerged from these deliberations.45
Agency staff were well aware that many citizens objected to unwanted
40

Id.
Competition & Markets Authority, Online Platforms and Digital Advertising – Market
Study Final Report (July 1, 2020); Tobin Center, supra.
42
Id.
43
Gavil et al., supra note 34, at 68.
44
The leading account of the history of the FTC’s privacy programs is CHRIS JAY
HOOFNAGLE, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION PRIVACY LAW AND POLICY (2016).
45
Timothy J. Muris, Chairman, Federal Trade Commission Protecting Consumers’
Privacy: 2002 and Beyond (Oct. 4, 2001) (remarks delivered at The Privacy 2001 Conference
in Cleveland, Ohio).
41
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telemarketing sales calls, since the FTC’s main consumer protection data
base (Consumer Sentinel), had recorded a growing volume of complaints
about unsolicited sales calls. Muris and Beales also examined the efforts of
a number of state governments to establish do-not-call systems of their
own.46 The two FTC officials drew upon these sources of learning to devise
a mechanism to give citizens control over whether telemarketers could
access their phone numbers.
The DNC Rule allowed citizens to enroll their telephone numbers in a
registry which telemarketers were required to purchase. The DNC Registry
was structured on an opt-in basis – a fact that became important in
subsequent litigation. Telemarketers are forbidden to call numbers
contained in the DNC Registry. Telemarketers must check the DNC
Registry every three months to get an updated list of people who do not
want to be called. Telemarketers who called people on the DNC Registry
could be fined up to $11,000 for each violation. The DNC Rule excluded
calls placed by charitable institutions, political fund-raising campaigns, and
those that involved a pre-existing commercial relationship.
The DNC Rule was a bet-your-agency initiative. It was a bold approach to
what many consumers perceived to be a serious problem. If the DNC Rule
was effective, the FTC would accumulate political capital that could be
spent on other projects, including controversial matters that aroused
opposition from vested political interests. If, on the other hand, the DNC
Rule failed, the FTC would suffer a massive reputational loss that would
permanently tarnish its stature and weaken its ability to pursue the balance
of its portfolio of antitrust and consumer protection programs.
III.
DESIGN CHALLENGES
The development of the DNC Rule forced the FTC to confront six major
challenges: assembling and sustaining the necessary team of FTC
professionals; developing a new theory of harm; complying with protections
for free speech; ensuring the technical feasibility and effective management
of the registration system; deflecting legislative opposition; and securing
needed cooperation of other government agencies (notably, the Federal
Communications Commission). We address each of these challenges in
turn.

46

At the time the DNC Registry was launched in June 2003, some 36 states had
established their own do-not-call laws, and 26 of these states had created their own registries.
The FTC’s rule did not preempt these state regimes, except to preempt state laws that were
less restrictive than the FTC rule.
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A. Assembling the Team
In Washington, it is widely believed that “personnel is policy.”47 The
formulation of an effective DNC Rule required the FTC to assemble the
right team. Muris chose one of the FTC’s preeminent attorneys, Lois
Greisman, to head the DNC effort. Greisman had achieved distinction as an
attorney in the Bureau of Consumer Protection and in service as the Chief
of Staff to two FTC chairs (Robert Pitofsky and Timothy Muris).48 The
selection of Greisman to head the DNC effort, and the assembly of a strong
supporting team, reflected the agency’s understanding, derived from past
experience with rulemaking and litigation, that ambitious policy initiatives
can succeed only if led by and carried out by truly superior personnel. To
design and implement the DNC Rule, the FTC mobilized its very best
resources.
Muris and Greisman also understood that the right team for the job should
include engineers and other technologists. The technologists assisted at
various points during the design of the DNC Rule and DNC Registry,
including the selection of a vendor to run the DNC Registry, and
elaboration of the registration process. This wrinkle suggests a larger point:
a regulator dealing with technologically dynamic sectors is likely to find it
necessary to develop its own team of technologists to understand the
affected sector.
B. A New Theory of Harm
In prior consumer protection initiatives, the FTC relied on theories of harm
based on unfairness or deception. Those theories were directly based on the
FTC Act, which authorized it to pursue cases involving “unfair methods of
competition,” and “unfair or deceptive acts or practices.”49 FTC staff had
plenty of experience applying these theories of harm to every form of
misconduct under the sun.
However, these two classic theories of consumer harm didn’t fit all that well
with the DNC rule. Instead, the harm at issue consisted of unwanted

47

See, e.g., Scot Faulkner, Personnel is Policy, WASH. EXAMINER, Feb. 2, 2016,
https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/personnel-is-policy; David E. Lewis, Personnel Is
Policy: George W. Bush’s Managerial Presidency in PRESIDENT GEORGE W. BUSH’S
INFLUENCE OVER BUREAUCRACY AND POLICY. THE EVOLVING AMERICAN PRESIDENCY
SERIES (Palgrave Macmillan, New York (2009)).
48
In December 2021, Greisman received the 2021 Presidential Rank Award given for
distinguished service in the federal government’s Senior Executive Service. Federal Trade
Commission, Press Release, FTC’s Lois C. Greisman Earns Presidential Rank Award (Dec.
17, 2021), at https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2021/12/ftcs-lois-c-greismanearns-presidential-rank-award.
49
15 U.S.C. § 45.
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intrusion into the home.50 It would be difficult for the Commission to assert
that unwanted telephone calls to the home imposed economic harm (at least
in the traditional sense). Some telemarketers might have engaged in unfair
or deceptive conduct, but proceeding against them missed the far larger
number of telemarketing calls that were unwanted – but not unfair or
deceptive.
Instead of relying on unfairness or deception, the FTC used the
Telemarketing Act, which allowed it to challenge “abusive” conduct. Thus,
rather than attempt to fit a square peg (unwanted telemarketing calls) into a
round hole (a well-developed framework based on unfair or deceptive
conduct), the FTC came up with a novel (and therefore untested) theory of
harm that more closely matched the conduct in question.
C. Complying with the 1st Amendment
The 1 Amendment presented the second major challenge to the DNC Rule.
At the time, it was far from clear whether the DNC Rule, which seemingly
made the FTC the arbiter of whether commercial actors could speak to their
desired audience, was compatible with the requirements of the 1st
Amendment. To address this concern, agency staff conducted intensive
internal studies and consulted external experts – including academics who
advised industry opponents to the DNC Rule. These external consultations
provided invaluable insight into the likely objections to be raised against the
DNC Rule.51 These same consultations also alerted the FTC that an
influential legislator had decided to side with the telemarketers – despite
public statements indicating his support for the FTC’s DNC Rule.52
st

The FTC’s conclusion that the DNC Rule would survive constitutional
scrutiny rested heavily on Rowan v. United States Post Office Department,
where the Supreme Court had upheld a Post Office policy that allowed
postal customers to direct the Post Office to intercept and withhold delivery
of disfavored forms of mail such as pornographic content.53 Indeed, Rowan
50

Muris, Protecting Consumers’ Privacy, supra note 45 (“Consumers’ third concern is
with practices that are unwanted intrusions in our daily lives. Unwanted phone calls disrupt
our dinner, and our computers are littered with spam. There are unwanted solicitations for
pornography and other products many find objectionable. Individually, the injury is
relatively small, but in the aggregate the harm can be great.”).
51
One of us (Kovacic) recalls a particularly useful meeting in 2002 in which a former
FTC Commissioner working for a telemarketing client arranged for a 1st Amendment scholar
to review potential free speech concerns about the rule. In a careful, analytical manner, the
expert identified several ways in which DNC Rule was vulnerable to challenge under the 1st
Amendment.
52
See infra notes 56-57, and accompanying text.
53
397 U.S. 728 (1970) (ruling that a vendor does not have a constitutional right to send
unwanted material to an unwilling postal service addressee; upholding constitutionality of a
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was the reason the FTC had structured the DNC Rule on an opt-in basis. If
Rowan was still good law, FTC staff believed that the DNC Rule (which
employed a similar opt-in to prevent intrusions into the home) would
withstand legal challenge.
Of course, an opt-in approach would only work if enough consumers were
sufficiently irritated by unwanted calls to go through the necessary
rigamarole to enroll in the DNC registry. Based on decades of work in the
consumer protection space, FTC staff were well aware that defaults
mattered in how people behave – and a careful examination of the consumer
complaint database convinced FTC staff that consumers were so annoyed
with unsolicited sales calls that they would take the time and effort to
register their phone numbers with the FTC’s DNC system.54 An opt-out
approach would have avoided this problem entirely – but would have
dramatically increased the vulnerability of the DNC Rule to a challenge
under the 1st Amendment.
Rowan was an important precedent for defending the FTC’s opt-in regime
in the DNC Rule, but the outcome was hardly free from doubt. Rowan predated Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp., in which the Supreme Court
expanded the protection of commercial speech.55 Subsequent Court
decisions underscored and extended the principle of Central Hudson but did
not confront the scenario at issue in Rowan. Did Rowan retain vitality in the
face of Central Hudson and its progeny? Or was it no longer good law? The
answer was far from clear when the FTC issued the DNC Rule.
Similar difficulties were raised by the structure of the DNC Rule, which
applied to commercial actors but excluded calls placed by charitable
institutions and political fund-raising campaigns. This structure was largely
dictated by the political realities of the situation – but the resulting underinclusiveness of the DNC Rule created an obvious basis for attack.
D. Ensuring Technical Feasibility
The next challenge FTC staff confronted was technical feasibility of the
DNC Registry. Given the extent of broad social discontent with unwanted
telemarketing calls, FTC staff believed that millions of people would sign
up for the DNC Registry – with a disproportionate share coming in the first
law authorizing postal customers to instruct the Postmaster to block delivery of posted
material from specific senders).
54
As noted previously, the DNC Registry was launched in June, 2003 – pre-dating
Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein’s NUDGE by almost six years.
55
447 U.S. 557 (1980). The significance for FTC policymaking of Central Hudson and
later Supreme Court decisions involving commercial speech is analyzed in William
MacLeod et al., Three Rules and a Constitution: Consumer Protection Finds Its Limits in
Competition Policy, 72 Antitrust L.J. 943 (2005).
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few days after the program was launched. Unless the FTC could deliver a
smooth and glitch-free registration process that minimized user frustration,
the entire initiative might blow up on the launching pad.
Implementing the DNC Registry involved a classic “make or buy” decision.
FTC staff quickly concluded they should not handle the registration process
in-house. Instead, FTC staff decided to contract with AT&T to handle the
back-office operations of the DNC list, including the registration process.
The contract with AT&T set strict performance requirements, and FTC staff
worked closely with AT&T personnel on pre-implementation testing to
ensure reliability. Although FTC staff believed the DNC Registry would be
extremely popular, they still underestimated the rate at which people would
enroll when it opened for business on June 27, 2003. So many people
enrolled in the first hour that the transaction load nearly crashed the system.
In the end, careful attention by FTC staff (including in-house technologists)
to the technical aspects of the DNC Registry helped ensure a successful
launch of the registration process. The wisdom of the FTC’s focus on this
issue was validated just over a decade later, when healthcare.gov failed on
launch – further inflaming the debate over the wisdom of Obamacare.
E. Legislative Opposition
The next obstacle to the DNC Rule was Congress. Many members of
Congress endorsed the DNC rule with great enthusiasm. At the same time,
several influential legislators (including one who publicly supported the
DNC Rule) believed it would badly damage the telemarketing industry -endangering tens of thousands of jobs.56 Notwithstanding robust support for
the rule in Congress, these opponents were formidable and one of them (i.e.,
Representative Billy Tauzin) occupied a gatekeeping position in the
lawmaking process. When push came to shove, an attempt to deny the
agency funding to implement the DNC Rule was narrowly defeated – but it
was a near-run thing.57

56

Though outwardly a friend of the DNC Rule, Rep. Billy Tauzin actively worked to
prevent congressional approval of legislation responding to an adverse district court decision.
See infra notes 61-62, and accompanying text. One of us (Kovacic) observed these dynamics
during contemporaneous discussions with the FTC’s Office of Congressional Affairs, which
was working to secure passage of the necessary legislation.
57
Given the limited time available on the legislative calendar, the advocates of a
Congressional fix to the appropriations issue had a narrow window to achieve their goal.
Opponents came within four hours of blocking the measure that made it clear that Congress
had authorized the FTC to spend funds to carry out the DNC Rule.
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F. Inter-Agency Cooperation
Acting alone, the FTC lacked the authority to implement an effective DNC
regime.58 By statute, the FTC has no jurisdiction over common carriers
(including telecommunications service companies), not-for-profit
enterprises, and banks.59 Obviously, entities that fell within these categories
were responsible for a significant number of telemarketing calls. A DNC
Rule that excluded all of them would be woefully incomplete.
Students of public administration know that willing cooperation between
different parts of the government is not a given. Departments, agencies,
commissions, and bureaus all jealously guard their turf – and the question
“what’s in this for us/me” is likely to be top of mind when agencies are
deciding whether to cooperate with another. Even when there are
overlapping grants of regulatory authority, the relevant public agency actors
do not routinely regard cooperation with their government counterparts as
appealing, much less as a potential source of better performance.60 Agencies
may be more concerned with serving their own institutional prerogatives
than achieving superior common solutions.
So, enlisting the FCC in a joint effort required the FTC to come up with a
plan that would make it in the FCC’s interest to join in. To motivate the
FCC to adopt a rule mirroring the DNC Rule, the FTC engaged in extensive
discussions with the FCC’s leadership, building consensus about the gains
from creating a DNC system, and the mutual benefits of policy integration
across both agencies.
IV.

IMPLEMENTATION CHALLENGES

The FTC spent considerable time and effort working through the design
issues outlined in Part III, but it still faced three distinct post-launch
implementation challenges. The first challenge involved the lawsuits
brought by the telemarketing industry. The second challenge involved
technological change, combined with aggressive adaptive efforts by new
entrants in the telemarketing space. The third challenge involved heightened
expectations among the general public and Congress. We address each in
turn.

58
The archipelago of public institutions with responsibility for privacy protection is
described in Hyman & Kovacic, Implementing Privacy Policy, supra note 5.
59
Congress incorporated these jurisdictional limitations into the original (1914) FTC
Act, and has left them in place despite dramatic change in the nature and operation of the
affected sectors.
60
Hyman & Kovacic, Enforcement in a Polycentric World, supra note 5; Hyman &
Kovacic, Why Who Does What Matters, supra note 5.
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A. Litigation
The telemarketing industry filed two lawsuits (one in federal district court
in Oklahoma City, and one in federal district court in Denver) seeking to
block implementation of the DNC Rule. The industry chose venues in
which it could expect a sympathetic hearing: both district courts were
located in the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, which had historically been
quite skeptical of government regulatory interventions.
In both of these challenges, the plaintiffs prevailed and the federal district
courts directed the FTC to stand down.61 Taken together, the district court
decisions held that the DNC Rule (a) impermissibly restricted free speech,
and (b) the Commission lacked congressional authority to impose the fee
collection mechanism to fund the Rule’s implementation. If these positions
were sustained on appeal, the DNC initiative would have come to a
screeching halt.
On the day of the second adverse district court decision, Chairman
Muris convened a meeting of the leadership team responsible for the
implementation of the DNC Rule. One of us (Kovacic) was the agency’s
General Counsel and attended the meeting. The mood in the room was
grim, except for Muris, who praised the team for its work to date, assumed
full responsibility for the strategy and tactics employed so far, and declared
his confidence in the ultimate success of the initiative.
In our view, this was leadership of the highest order. Muris rallied his team
to redouble their efforts and focus on finding solutions. He instructed the
congressional relations staff to work with the FTC’s supporters in Congress
to draft legislation to cure the perceived appropriations law deficiency. The
legislature’s response was immediate and wholeheartedly supportive. In
three days, Congress adopted the needed measure, and President George W.
Bush signed the law.62 By way of comparison, it took Congress a full week
post-9-11 to enact an Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF).
The second equally urgent priority was to petition for a stay of the adverse
district court decisions pending appeal. Here luck played an important role.
The three judges randomly assigned to the panel for the stay petition were
far less hostile to the government than the Tenth Circuit as a whole. The
panel granted the FTC’s petition,63 and when the same panel heard the
61
Mainstream Marketing Services, Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission, 283 F.Supp. 2d
1151 (D. Colo. 2003); U.S. Security v. Federal Trade Commission, 2003 WL 22203719
(W.D. Okla. Sept. 25, 2003).
62
An Act to Ratify the Authority of the Federal Trade Commission to Establish a DoNot-Call Registry, Pub. L. 108-82, 117 Stat. 1006 (2003).
63
Federal Trade Commission v. Mainstream Marketing Services, Inc., 345 F.3d 850
th
(10 Cir. 2003) (per curiam).
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dispute on the merits, the FTC prevailed.64 The Supreme Court
subsequently denied certiorari.65
The FTC could have easily drawn a more hostile stay panel – which would
have been more representative of the views of the Tenth Circuit. If a more
hostile panel had denied the stay petition, critical momentum would have
been lost, and the DNC Registry might have never been launched. As this
counter-factual demonstrates, one should never underestimate the role of
luck in agency success (and failure).
B. Adaptive Responses
Every law and regulation triggers adaptive responses, as affected industries
try to identify loopholes.66 Technological change also provides multiple
opportunities for affected firms to circumvent regulatory controls –
particularly when the incentives to do so are large.67 This means that “one
and done” is never a recipe for regulatory success. Of course, design
choices affect how hard it is to circumvent the regulatory prohibitions, and
politics will affect enforcement. Nonetheless, the basic lesson – that
regulators must remain vigilant, and change tactics when circumstances
change -- remains.
After the DNC Registry was launched, the frequency of unwanted
telemarketing calls dropped precipitously – although the DNC Rule’s carveouts ensured the rate would never drop to zero. But, as anyone with a cell
phone can attest, the volume of unwanted calls rebounded after the
emergence of robo-calling and spoofing technology.68 After
underestimating these problems for a good while, the FTC, the FCC, and
the state attorneys general have sought to challenge these practices.69
Congress has also considered (but not adopted) amendments to the
Telemarketing Sales Act to forestall these avenues for circumvention.70
64
Mainstream Marketing Services, Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission, 358 F.3d 1228
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 47 (2004).
65
Id.
66
The race between competitors seeking to fix prices and antitrust agencies seeking to
deter price fixing is but one example. William E. Kovacic, Robert C. Marshall & Michael J.
Meurer, Serial collusion by multi-product firms, 6 J. Antitrust Enforcement 296 (2018).
67
See, e.g., The Future of Privacy: Can we safeguard our information in a high-tech,
insecure world?, Scientific American (Sept. 2008).
68
Sarah Krouse, Robocallers Dial Up Extra Cash, Wall St. J., June 5, 2018, at BI.
69
Federal Trade Commission, Prepared Statement, Abusive Robocalls and How We Can
Stop Them, Before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation (Apr.
18, 2018); see also Kelcee Griffis, AGs, Carriers Unite To Trace and Block Robocalls,
Law360
(Aug.26,
2019),
https://www.law360.com/articles/1191504/print?section=cybersecurity-privacy.
70
Grant Gross, Congress takes on robocalls, Washington Examiner, Apr. 16, 2019, at
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The FTC did prepare several reports noting that new technologies would
complicate its consumer protection mission, but it failed to draw the
connection between these developments and the future integrity of the DNC
Rule.71 Although the FTC has brought multiple enforcement cases, resulting
in $50 million in civil penalties and $71 million in “redress or
disgorgement,”72 the rise in the number of unwanted calls has led some
observers to treat the DNC Registry as a dismal failure.73
C. Heightened Expectations
When a regulator announces it has taken steps to address a problem,
ordinary citizens and legislators expect the intervention will fix that
problem.74 This means that the regulator now “owns” the problem. The
reputational and institutional rewards for the agency and for those
responsible will be large if the agency succeeds – but the consequences can
be severe if the agency falls short. The more salient the problem (e.g.,
because it deals with an important product such as gasoline that consumers

34.

71

See, e.g., Federal Trade Commission, Consumer Protection & Competition
Regulation in a High-Tech World: Discussing the Future of the Federal Trade Commission
(Dec. 2013); Federal Trade Commission, Protecting Consumers in the Next Tech-ade
(Spring 2008).
72
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/media-resources/do-not-call-registry/enforcement
73
For representative statements of this view, see Simon Van Zuylen-Wood, Triumph of
the
Robo-Callers,
Wash.
Post,
Jan.
11,
2018,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/magazine/how-robo-call-moguls-outwitted-thegovernment-and-completely-wrecked-the-do-not-call-list/2018/01/09/52c769b6-df7a-11e7bbd0-9dfb2e37492a_story.html; Helaine Olen, Congratulations! You Lost, Slate (May 24,
2016), https://slate.com/business/2016/05/robocalls-have-triumphed-over-the-do-not-calllist-whose-fault-is-it.html
74
This dynamic is particularly important when the regulator is contemplating initiatives
that would stretch the application of its mandate to encompass policy concerns that have not
been addressed by that regulator in the past. That issue is likely to prove vexing to the Federal
Reserve in the future:
The Fed is a technocratic body that can move quickly because it
operates under few political constraints. Turning to it as the first line of
defense in this and future crises could compromise its institutional
independence. Mr. Powell knew there were risks with the central bank’s
incursion into credit policy. . . .
Having crossed familiar boundaries, there was a danger, he
understood, that lawmakers would come to the Fed later and say, “Fix
climate change” or “Use your digital printing press to finance every
highway repair.”
Nick Timaraos, March 2020: How the Fed Averted Economic Disaster, WALL ST. J.,
Feb. 18, 2022, https://www.wsj.com/articles/march-2020-how-the-fed-averted-economicdisaster-11645199788. See also Kovacic & Hyman Regulatory Leveraging, supra note 5.
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purchase frequently), the greater the reputational damage that comes with a
perceived failure to solve it.
Consider the investigations by the U.K.’s CMA of the energy and
commercial banking sectors in the early 2010s. The announcement of these
investigations created predictable expectations: i.e., that the CMA’s
intervention would reduce consumers’ costs for energy and commercial
banking. After an extensive investigation, the CMA imposed a targeted set
of reforms to address problematic conduct that its research had uncovered.75
However, many observers had hoped for a “big bang” package of remedies
(e.g., restructuring of the entire industry -- the sort of structural relief now
proposed by some Big Tech critics). The dashing of expectations led to
recriminations, and charges that the CMA’s approach was timid and
inadequate.76 Had expectations not been raised in the first instance, the
CMA would not have been criticized for failing to deliver. One also can ask
whether the CMA was unwise to initiate two highly ambitious and visible
investigations at roughly the same time – in effect, starting two matters for
which the failure to satisfy expectations of a dramatic “cure” posed serious
reputational risks for the agency.
Of course, expectations are also influenced by evidence of performance, or
the lack thereof. For some interventions, citizens have little ability to
observe or evaluate the effectiveness of government agency action. If the
FTC blocks a merger of two producers of an intermediate input for an
industrial process, the impact of the intervention will likely be hard to detect
and may be invisible. The DNC Rule is different; either the unwanted calls
disappear, or they do not.
It is not just ordinary citizens whose expectations are elevated. The success
of the DNC Rule resulted in dramatically raised Congressional
expectations. It was as if NASA’s success in getting to the Moon was
immediately met with, “ok, how soon can you get us to Mars?” Influential
members of Congress concluded that the FTC would be able to solve all
future problems using similar strategies. Congressional pressure for “do not
spam” and “do not track” was the predictable result – even though neither
of those were likely to work out as Congress expected, even without taking
account of technological adaptation.77 When the FTC made it clear that “do
75
Competition & Markets Authority, Retail Banking and Market Investigation -- Final
Report (Aug. 8, 2016); Competition & Markets Authority, Energy Market Investigation –
Final Report (June 24, 2016).
76
Jill Treanor, Watchdog demands banking overhaul to save customers money, THE
GUARDIAN, Aug. 9, 2016; Hulya Dagdeviren, Energy market investigation a let down for
consumers paying more for power, THE CONVERSATION, June 27, 2016.
77
https://www.computerworld.com/article/2565578/ftc-won-t-create-do-not-spam-
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not spam” and “do not track” were unlikely to work out well, Congressional
disappointment was higher than it would have been in the absence of the
raised expectations created by the FTC’s earlier success with the DNC
Rule.
V.

LESSONS FOR BIG TECH RULEMAKING

The DNC Rule was successful because everything that was required
(including innovative leadership, experience with rulemaking, careful
preparation, partnership with the FCC, political support, and no shortage of
luck in handling the resulting litigation) came together at one point in time.
However, success led to heightened expectations – and technological
developments created a game of regulatory Whac-A-Mole that the FTC
wasn’t ready to play. What are the lessons of this initiative – which was
successful until it wasn’t -- for the regulation of Big Tech?
A. Learn From Past Successes (And Failures)
Successful institutions (whether public or private) learn from the past.
When agency leaders evaluate policy initiatives with a historical lens, they
can more readily anticipate problems with their proposed strategy -- and
develop solutions.78 “Thinking in time” is a powerful tool for agency
personnel who want to do better.79 Those who hope to master “the
regulatory craft” can get a head start by learning from the successes and
failures of their predecessors, not just within the same agency, but also
across agencies and jurisdictions.80
Learning from the experiences of others is even more important when a
proposed initiative departs from the established models. Learning should
also cover the full range of prior agency performance, ranging from runaway successes (the proverbial grand-slam) to programs that have generated
mixed results (which strikes us as an accurate description of the FTC’s
DNC rule, viewed from the vantage point of 2022) to out-and-out failures.
Agency personnel should evaluate the factors that were associated with all
three of these outcomes. Did the agency lose a case because its theory was
bad – or because it didn’t field the right team to argue the case?81 Did the
agency have the capacity/bandwidth to optimally manage its litigation
portfolio? Might the agency have done better by focusing on fewer cases
and doing a better job on each of them? Did the agency lose because the
court was relying on flawed empirical assumptions, and how can the agency
list.html
78
RICHARD E. NEUSTADT & ERNEST R. MAY, THINKING IN TIME (1987).
79
Id. at 270.
80
Malcolm K. Sparrow, THE REGULATORY CRAFT (2000).
81
Kovacic & Hyman, Consume or Invest, supra note 5.
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rebut those assumptions in the next piece of litigation? Similar questions
should apply to the full range of formal rulemaking and guidance.
Viewed from this perspective, the study of partially successful and failed
initiatives generates valuable insight on how to do better the next time. This
is similar to the ways in which Morbidity and Mortality (M&M) rounds are
a critical learning device for physicians.82
Although we have focused on the importance of learning from past efforts
by the FTC and DOJ, it is important to recognize that many other regulators
– state, federal, and foreign – may have useful insights to share. In an ideal
policymaking environment, regulators within and across jurisdictions would
engage in continuous cycle that consists of testing specific regulatory
measures, evaluating outcomes, and making refinements based on lessons
derived from the evaluation process. Cooperation ensures that individual
agencies are not working in isolation but instead benefit from knowledge
acquired across a wide range of institutions.
Finally, all of these considerations have particular significance when we are
in the midst of a global campaign to regulate Big Tech. The regulatory
mechanisms that are being developed and deployed are still under
construction – meaning the entire process is inherently experimental. None
of the jurisdictions pursing these measures can be confident that they have
the “right” policy solution. Design variation across jurisdictions will permit
the testing of alternatives and allow for convergence on superior techniques
– as long as there is ongoing ex post assessment and updating. Methods for
assessment should be built into the regulatory framework from the
beginning, rather than bolted on after implementation is well underway.
Stated differently, once the plane is in the air, it is too late to add the
instrument panel that will ensure a safe landing.83
B. Get the Right Team in Place
In sports, having the right team is critical. Consider the Baltimore Orioles
circa 1966. The Orioles had flirted with excellence for several years, but it
never delivered. The addition of Frank Robinson (HOF, 1982) following a
trade with the Cincinnati Reds in December, 1965, was transformational.

82

CHARLES BOSK, FORGIVE AND REMEMBER (1988).
In fairness, EDS made a memorable commercial in 2000 suggesting that with the right
expertise, one could build a plane in the air. See https://adland.tv/adnews/eds-airplane-2000060-usa. See also Ruth Walker, ‘Build the plane while you’re flying it,’ Christian Science
Monitor,
Mar.
24,
2016,
https://www.csmonitor.com/The-Culture/The-HomeForum/2016/0324/Build-the-plane-while-you-re-flying-it. But, we doubt the FAA would
approve such a strategy, nor would any airline accept a plan built under such circumstances.
83
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The Orioles won the American League pennant (its first since 1944), and
then swept the Dodgers in four games to win their first-ever World Series.
In an interview after Robinson’s death, Jim Palmer (HOF, 1990), recounted
seeing Robinson at Orioles spring training in 1966:
I still remember the first time I ever saw him swing a bat. . .
I’m sitting next to Dick Hall on the bench, and Frank had
come to Baltimore to look for housing and then he come to
spring training, so he’s a little bit late, we’re playing the
inter-squad game at Miami stadium, and [Steve] Cosgrove
throws him one of these perfect curve balls, down and away,
and he gets out on his front foot, but he keeps his hands back
and hits it off the chalk line for a double, and I turned to
Dick Hall and I said “I think we just won the pennant.”84
A similar dynamic applies to public agencies. As noted previously, the
DNC Rule faced political headwinds – plus two separate bet-your-agency
pieces of litigation in unfavorable fora. Assembling the right team was a
critical component in addressing these challenges – and the complexities
and difficulties of regulating Big Tech are much harder. The telemarketing
industry was well funded and was reasonably politically connected, but it
was a molehill compared to the Mt. Everest scale, wealth, and
sophistication of Big Tech. Each of the four Big Tech companies has a
major lobbying presence in D.C., and all four are veterans of past antitrust
litigation. They have already retained the best antitrust lawyers available
and thrown money at academics and other commentators -- all as battle
space preparation for the coming fight.
To be competitive, the responsible agencies will need to pull together an “A
team” of lawyers, economists, and technologists, and assign them to work
only on Big Tech for an extended period of time. That assignment is harder
than it sounds, because most agencies face capacity and capability
constraints that limit their ability to perform the tasks they are currently
handling – let alone taking on an entirely new flagship initiative like the
regulation of Big Tech.
By way of (unfavorable) comparison, the UK’s CMA has a large dedicated
Data, Technology & Analytics (DaTA) team.85 This is what a regulator with
a real commitment to understanding technological phenomena and
performing state-of-the-art data analytics looks like. Regulating Big Tech is
84

https://www.facebook.com/MASNOrioles/videos/jim-palmer-on-the-legacy-offrank-robinson/2437970176276134/.
85
https://competitionandmarkets.blog.gov.uk/2019/05/28/the-cma-data-unit-weregrowing/

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4042914

21

LESSONS FROM DO NOT CALL

not a case where “fake it until you make it” will work. Any attempt to
regulate Big Tech with ex ante rules requires regulators to ensure their
actual capabilities match their announced commitments.
C. Manage Expectations
As noted previously, heightened expectations can lead to disappointment
and disillusion. By lowering expectations – by “under-promising,” those
responsible will buy themselves time and breathing room so they can “overdeliver.” Although it is tempting to point to the bleachers and swing for the
fences,86 the goal for the agency should be to “get on base” – which means
not biting off more than the agency can successfully defend in terms of the
scope of the ex ante rules, and then racking up some quick successes.87
Unfortunately, some prominent New Brandeisians have gone out of their
way to create unrealistic expectations. On several occasions, Professor Tim
Wu has claimed that winning sweeping antitrust lawsuits against
exceptionally well financed opponents is “easy.” For example, in 2018, Wu
was quoted as follows: “‘if you took a hard look at the acquisition of
WhatsApp and Instagram, the argument that the effects of those acquisitions
have been anticompetitive would be easy to prove for a number of reasons,’
says Wu. And breaking up the company wouldn’t be hard, he says.”88
Similarly, in 2020, after the FTC and 40 states sued Facebook, Professor
Wu asserted “this is straightforward and an easy case.”89 Although Wu
thought the case against Facebook would be “smooth sailing,” other
commentators were less sanguine, highlighting all the difficulties that lay
ahead.90 One of those difficulties materialized roughly six months later,
when the case was dismissed for failing to allege a necessary element of a
monopolization.91 Although the FTC refiled its case, and the amended
pleading survived a motion to dismiss, this was still not an auspicious start.
More broadly, this episode makes clear that despite his brief tenure at the
86
We refer of course, to Babe Ruth, playing the Chicago Cubs in game 3 of the 1937
World Series. See Chris Landers, True or False? The Babe Called His Shot, Feb. 6, 2020,
https://www.mlb.com/news/did-babe-ruth-call-his-shot
87
Moneyball,
He
Gets
on
Base
Scene,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PlKDQqKh03Y.
88
Nilay Patel, Its Time to Break Up Facebook, The Verge, Sep. 4, 2018,
https://www.theverge.com/2018/9/4/17816572/tim-wu-facebook-regulation-interviewcurse-of-bigness-antitrust
89
Mike Isaac & Cecilia Kang, ‘It’s Hard to Prove’: Why Antitrust Suits Against
Facebook
Face
Hurdles,
N.Y.
Times,
Dec.
10,
2020,
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/10/technology/facebook-antitrust-suits-hurdles.html.
90
Id.
91
Salvador Rodriguez, Judge dismisses FTC and state antitrust complaints against
Facebook,
CNBC,
https://www.cnbc.com/2021/06/28/judge-dismisses-ftc-antitrustcomplaint-against-facebook.html
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FTC, Professor Wu severely underestimates the difficulty of winning a
monopolization case. Once you leave the realm of conduct that fits
squarely in the zone of per se illegality, nothing is ever “easy.”
In fairness, FTC Chairman Khan has been more circumspect, particularly in
her statements since becoming the agency’s chair in June 2021.92 But, more
needs to be done to manage (by which we mean lower) expectations.
D. You’re Gonna Need A Bigger Boat
In any endeavor, success requires tools equal to the task. In the classic film
thriller Jaws, a 25-foot great white shark terrorizes the seaside community
of Amity Island. Three men (Brody (the local sheriff), Quint (a professional
shark hunter), and Hooper (an oceanographer)) set out in a boat to hunt for
the shark. In the most memorable scene in the movie, Brody is tossing chum
into the ocean when the shark suddenly emerges from the water and
displays its massive jaws. Visibly shaken, Brody backs away from the stern
and finds Quint – whom he tells “You’re gonna need a bigger boat.”93
To fulfill their policy aims for Big Tech, regulators are going to need a
bigger boat as well – either in the form of better tools, or in a different
approach to using the tools they already possess. The existing antitrust
toolkit suffers from several weaknesses. The first problem is delay.
Antitrust litigation against Big Tech will take years.94 A process that yields
remedial results in the middle of this decade or later is ill-suited to a sector
marked by extraordinary dynamism.
The second problem is that the current doctrinal framework is hostile to the
claims advanced by the New Brandeisians. Since the late 1970s, Supreme
Court decisions interpreting Section 2 of the Sherman Act have imposed
few limits on the discretion of dominant firms.95 Antitrust enforcers will
face an uphill battle persuading judges to abandon or limit this extensive
body of precedent.
A third problem is the scope of the harms that enforcers are trying to
address. Much of the conduct of Big Tech targeted by the New Brandeisians
implicates policy domains outside of antitrust -- including consumer
92
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protection and privacy. That means that existing antitrust doctrine is often a
poor fit with the underlying problem. When the FTC confronted this
problem developing the DNC Rule, it switched theories, rather than try to
jam a square peg into a round hole.
For the New Brandeisians, switching theories will mean creating an ex ante
regulatory framework that incorporates antitrust doctrine plus consumer
protection and privacy – in the same way that the FTC focused on “abusive”
behavior, rather than deception or unfairness in developing the DNC Rule.
However, the FTC could rely on the Telemarketing Act as a basis for the
DNC Rule, while it is far less clear that Congress has authorized the FTC to
develop ex ante rules based on competition policy considerations.
Almost fifty years ago, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the
authority of the FTC to promulgate substantive competition rules in
Petroleum Refiners, a case involving mandatory posting of octane ratings
on gasoline pumps.96 Two prominent New Brandeisians (Chairman Khan
and Rohit Chopra, former FTC Commissioner, and new head of the CFPB)
have argued that the Petroleum Refiners makes it clear that the FTC can use
rulemaking to regulate Big Tech without seeking additional authority from
Congress.97
However, the matter is far from clear. Since the D.C. Circuit upheld the
“Octane Rule” in 1973, the FTC has never promulgated additional
competition rules, although it considered doing so in connection with the
infamous KidVid initiative.98 And the analysis in Petroleum Refiners is a
free-wheeling (if not completely off-road) analysis of the FTC’s authority.
Prominent administrative law experts have argued that federal courts (and
particularly the Supreme Court) are unlikely to endorse Petroleum Refiners’
generous and creative interpretation of the Commission’s authority under
Section 6(g).99 Any attempt to build a new set of ex ante rules for Big Tech
on the FTC’s existing authority is asking for trouble – particularly given the
certainty of litigation. Express Congressional authorization to promulgate
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substantive competition rules is the bigger boat the New Brandeisians
should procure before setting sail.
E. Expect Litigation – and Adaptive Responses
Big Tech will not roll over and play dead. Instead, they will vigorously
challenge the ex ante rules, whatever their substantive content. Knowing
that litigation is certain, those responsible should engage with Big Tech
while the rules are being developed. This will give the agencies more
insight into likely grounds of attack – and allow it to build in defenses
(where feasible), rather than be forced to play defense on a weaker hand.
More broadly, ex ante public consultation will give those responsible for
developing the rules greater understanding of how they can maximize their
prospects for success and address the criticisms that inevitably will be
forthcoming from the courts and legislators.
What about adaptive response? For understandable reasons, regulators are
focused on the problem in front of them. That means that they are likely to
discount (or ignore entirely) the problem of adaptive response. The short
tenure of most agency heads means that they are likely to believe that
adaptive response is a problem for another day – whose consequences will
fall on the next person to head the agency.100 That approach is short-sighted
– but it is fully consistent with the advice most agency heads receive, to
focus on the “low-hanging fruit.”101
However, it is a certainty that even the dumbest of covered firms will take
steps to adapt to any set of regulatory commands and will do their best to
circumvent them – and no one has ever accused Big Tech of being dumb.
This dynamic places considerable pressure on the responsible agency’s
technology team to anticipate possible paths of adaptation and bypass. This
dynamism means that agencies must invest in their own technologists – and
be prepared to make constant fine (and not so fine) adjustments to the rules
as the industry responds to each round of regulation and regulatory revision.
When it comes to Big Tech, regulators must be as adaptive and flexible as
the firms they are regulating.
F. Hunt in Packs
When launching a regulatory assault, there is strength in numbers. A
company facing a multi-jurisdictional assault may sue for peace on terms
100
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101
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that are more favorable than if they were litigating the same cases seriatim.
A company facing multiple adversaries, each suing on different legal
theories, and each seeking independent recoveries/remedies will find their
resources stretched and they may make mistakes that a company facing a
single regulator would never make.
We have already noted that Big Tech is facing antitrust and privacy-related
litigation in multiple jurisdictions. We have also noted the interest of
foreign authorities in using new statutory authority (including the E.U.’s
Digital Markets Act) and new task forces (including the U.K.’s Digital
Markets Unit) to go after Big Tech. And the recent executive order on
promoting competition clearly recognizes the importance of inter-agency
cooperation, since it advises agencies with related policy functions to work
more closely together.102
Although the relevant U.S. agencies could certainly go it alone, they are
likely to do better if they coordinate their efforts with others engaged in the
same campaign. There is a reason why wolves hunt in packs – especially
when targeting big game.
VI.

BARRIERS FOR AGENCIES THAT WANT TO LEARN FROM THE PAST

Government agencies often fail to capture the benefits of “thinking in
time.”103 The first difficulty is that institutional incentives often discourage
agencies from investing in retrospection. Ex post reviews that reveal
problems weaken the agency’s image -- reducing Congressional willingness
to fund the agency at its current levels – and weakening the agency’s hand
in dealing with adversaries in court.
Second, agency management have their own strong incentives to prioritize
the prosecution of new cases and the preparation of new rules. Bringing
new cases and announcing new rulemaking projects bring favorable
headlines. The diversion of resources into ex post evaluation of earlier cases
and rules is likely to be viewed as academic navel-gazing.104 The
complexities of conducting a well-designed ex post study may also be
beyond the expertise of the agency -- reinforcing the assumption that such
evaluation constitutes an extravagant waste of resources.105
Management succession also complicates the ability of an agency to learn
from the past. New management will either have no interest in rehashing the
102
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policies of their predecessors – or may seek to use ex post reviews to
embarrass those who are no longer around to defend their decisions. In the
former case, the ex post review will never be conducted. In the latter case,
the ex post review will be viewed (both internally and externally) as a
hatchet job – limiting the possibility of using the process for learning or
improving agency performance.
Alternatively, new management may have gotten their positions by arguing
the agency needs to be transformed to perform its assigned tasks.106 Viewed
from this perspective, there is nothing to be learned from the past – since
everything that preceded the arrival of new management was an unmitigated
disaster. As it happens, a significant body of recent commentary has taken
exactly that view.107 And, as we have noted previously, prominent
contributors to that literature now occupy key positions in entities that will
be involved in developing ex ante regulations for Big Tech.108
Does it seem likely these individuals will be inclined to instruct others to
study the past performance of the FTC and the DOJ Antitrust Division
when they ascended to prominence by assailing the performance of these
same agencies? It does not take an expert in human psychology or an astute
student of public administration to recognize such instructions are unlikely
to be forthcoming unless those responsible for these disaster narratives are
willing to publicly “walk back” their prior criticisms. Anyone want to place
a bet on that happening?109
In an influential book, Professor Haidt noted how morality simultaneously
“binds and blinds.”110 Here, the narrative that enabled the New Brandeisians
to achieve power (by binding them together into a cohesive movement) also
blinds them to the steps they will need to take to successfully implement
their vision.
VII. CONCLUSION
Regulatory failure is a policy perennial – and bad implementation is often
the cause.111 Our case study of the FTC’s DNC Rule provides several
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lessons about the potential rewards and real-world risks associated with
using rulemaking to make public policy. Simply stated, the DNC Rule
solved the problem of unwanted calls – until it didn’t. Initial success was
not accidental, but was the result of excellent preparation, strong leadership,
the dedication of superior personnel, and a strong dose of administrative
guile. Subsequent developments provide a cautionary lesson about how
reform can falter when technological change or other dynamic features of
the market overwhelm the chosen mechanism for control. Regulators need
to anticipate and account for the adaptive responses of affected firms and
must continually monitor whether and how existing control measures are
being circumvented.
Good intentions are not enough. Neither are glowing press notices hailing a
new era in antitrust enforcement. Attempts to regulate Big Tech with ex
ante rulemaking face a significant risk of failure. Attending to the teachings
of history can change those probabilities in our favor.
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